Any AI that reads external content — emails, documents, web pages, tool results — can be instructed by that content; defense is layered architecture,
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Attacker text says 'ignore your instructions; do X.' Models follow instructions in content because that's what instruction-following is. Every RAG source, inbox, and scraped page is the attack surface.
The model gets least-privilege tools; dangerous actions require approval regardless of what any content says. If injected text can't reach a dangerous capability, injection becomes graffiti.
Mark untrusted content as data, constrain outputs to schemas, allow-list destinations for anything the system sends — mechanical fences around persuasion.
Injection payloads belong in your evaluation set; red-team the tool surface before launch and after every capability addition. Assume compromise of any single layer.
Skipping the discipline this article describes until an incident, audit, or stalled project forces it — every practice above is cheaper adopted early than retrofitted under pressure.
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